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DELIMITATION OF ERIE

good and the individual's right to be free from injury. As the expansion of the "public use" doctrine has greatly augmented government's power to implement the former, Sayre seems to be a reaction to
this power increase, thereby protecting the latter. However, by protecting
the individual's rights, Sayre has not impaired the public's interest, for
the streamlining of eminent domain procedures assures a quicker implementation of that interest while avoiding any accelerated deterioration
of the property that is the subject of that interest.
KENNETH

B. Hipp

Federal Jurisdiction-The Delimitation of Erie
and a Redefinition of "Laws"
In Ivey BroadcastingCo. v. American Telephone & Telegraph,1 plaintiff brought an action in federal court to recover damages for negligence
and breach of contract in the rendition of interstate telephone service.
Diversity of citizenship not being present, both the complaint and a
counterclaim for charges due for the same services were dismissed. The
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed, holding that federal
common law was applicable and that the district court had original
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.2
Reversing the normal order of analysis,' the court first held that federal law was controlling. It found that the field of interstate communications had been preEmpted by the federal government, especially where
the outcome of the case might adversely affect the federal policy of uniformity of rates.4 The court held that a congressional policy of uniformity of services could be implied from the congressional policy of
uniformity of rates embodied in the Interstate Communications Act of
1391 F.2d 486 (2d Cir. 1968), rev'g 234 F. Supp. 4 (N.D.N.Y. 1964).
'28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) (1964) reads:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions wherein the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $10,000 exclusive
of interest and costs, and arises under the Constitution, laws, or treaties
of the United States.
'Usually the courts treat the jurisdictional question first because there is a
presumption that the court lacks jurisdiction until it is shown that it has jurisdiction over the subject matter. C. WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF FEDERAL
COURTS 14 (1963).
'See Western Union Tel. Co. v. Speight, 254 U.S. 17 (1920); Western Union
Tel. Co. v. Boegli, 251 U.S. 315 (1920); Postal Tel.-Cable Co. v. Warren-Goodwin Lumber Co., 251 U.S. 27 (1919).
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1934.' In the absence of federal statutory law governing negligence and
breach of contract in interstate communications contracts, the federal
law to be applied was that derived from federal judicial decisions. The
court then interpreted the word "laws" in § 1331 to include such judicial decisions as a basis for original jurisdiction in the federal judicial
system. The federal courts were thereby given jurisdiction where "the
dispositive issues stated in the complaint require the application of federal common law ....

,,o The cases requiring this application of federal

common law are those in which "a distinctive policy of an Act of Con'7
gress requires that federal principles control the disposition of the claim."
This unusual approach by the court is indicative of the interrelationship between the jurisdictional issue and an important judicial development-the delimitation of the Erie' doctrine by the federal courts.,
This development originated in a reexamination of federal judicial competence by the federal courts.1 ° The basic finding of that reexamination
was that the federal judiciary possesses the necessary competence to decide the rules of law to be applied in cases which are primarily concerned
with the operation of congressional programs. Erie is read as holding
only that there is insufficient federal judicial competence in those areas
in which state law is in no way attributable to federal authority. 1 Professor Mishkin has gone so far as to say: "Such [federal judicial] competence is essential to the effective implementation of the legislative powers committed to the national government by the Constitution."' 2
The result of the new approach to Erie and federal judicial competence is the growth of a body of "specialized common law"' as opposed to the "federal general common law" that Justice Brandeis declared
in Erie to be beyond federal judicial power. 4 This "specialized federal
'48
Stat. 1064, as amended 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-609 (1964).
8391 F.2d at 492.
Id. at 493.
'Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
See generally Friendly, In Praise of Erie-and the New Federal Common
Law, 39 N.Y.U.L. REv. 383 (1964); Comment, Erie Limited: The Confines of
the State Law in the Federal Courts, 40 CORNELL L.Q. 561 (1955); Comment,
Federal Common Law and Article III: A Jurisdictional Approach to Erie, 74
YALE L.J. 325 (1964); Note, Clearfield: Clouded Field of Federal Common Law,
53 COL-um. L. REv. 991 (1953); Note, Exceptions to Erie v. Tompkins: The Survival0 of Federal Common Law, 59 HARv. L. REv. 966 (1946).
" See, e.g., Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943).
" Mishkin, The Variousness of "Federal Law": Competence and Discretion in
the Choice of National and State Rules of Decision, 105 U. PA. L. REv. 797 (1957).
" Id. at 797.
" Friendly, supra note 9, at 405.
1 304 U.S. at 78.
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common law" is applied in areas so controlled by federal statutory laws
that the courts can claim that those statutory laws, or the federal policies
that they embody, are the source of federal judicial authority.
Sola Electric Co. v. Jefferson Electric Co.:5 and Textile Workers
Union of America v. Lincoln Mills" ' exemplify the application of "specialized common law" in areas dominated by federal statutory law. The
decisions in these two cases effectuate congressional policy and protect
it from possible contravention by state laws. In Sola, the Supreme Court
ruled that the plaintiff, in responding to a counterclaim, could not invoke a state common law doctrine estopping the licensee of a patent from
challenging its validity. If the state estoppel doctrine had been applied
the licensor of an invalid patent would have been able to enforce a pricefixing stipulation in a license. Such an arrangement would have been
in conflict with the Sherman Act.1 7 By applying the federal estoppel
doctrine the Court allowed the defendant to challenge the validity of the
patent and thus the validity of the price-fixing stipulation. It thereby
helped protect and effectuate the federal policy against price restrictions
not protected by a patent monopoly. Sola was in the federal courts on
diversity of citizenship, but the courts have similarly applied "specialized
common law" to effectuate a congressional policy where jurisdiction was
based on a federal question. 8 In Textile Workers, the Supreme Court
interpreted a jurisdictional statute as a license to construct a whole body
of federal common law governing labor arbitration. The majority of
the Court claimed to be implementing the federal policy of promoting
industrial peace and orderY In both cases federal policy was controlling
even though there was rio specific statutory law governing the issue in
controversy.
4
The negligence and breach of contract issues in the Ivey case are similar
to issues in cases that are affected by the delimitation. The issues arise in
federally preempted areas and are not precisely covered by a federal statute. Also, the resolution of the issues may adversely affect a federal
policy. The principle to be drawn is that the federal courts will apply
federal common law to fill the interstices of congressional legislation in
20
order to effectuate congressional policy in federally preempted areas.
' 317 U.S. 173 (1942).
16353 U.S. 448 (1957).
17 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1964).
"8E.g., O'Dench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447 (1942); Deitrick v.
Greany, 309 U.S. 190 (1940).
'° 353 U.S. at 452-56.
.0Comment, Erie Limited, supra note 9, at 565.
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The federal courts feel particularly qualified to make this application
where the decision calls for uniformity of rules or involves the interpretation of federal statutes or the intent of Congress21
In cases where this delimitation is operative, original federal jurisdiction becomes an asset, if not a necessity. Its value can best be seen by
examining the consequences of the alternative solution the Ivey court
might have accepted.2" Since the state courts can be required to apply
federal law where applicable,' the court could have allowed the negligence
aid breach of contract issues to arise through the state courts, with the
Supreme Court reviewing any cases that might not conform with the
desired uniform federal standard. This solution would face a potential
problem of statutory interpretation, for the statute,24 which, in such circumstances, accords the Supreme Court its appellate reviewing power,
uses the word "statutes" instead of "laws." Thus, state decisions turning
on federal judicial law would not appear to be reviewable. However, in
reviewing state decisions interpreting judicially created maritime law,
the Court seems either to have ignored the problem or not to have had
it called to its attention.2 5
The alternative approach via state court litigation would also raise
the practical problem of the grounds upon which review could be sought.
With no written law established, an attorney would be placed in the
unenviable position of claiming that a state decision did not conform to
an as yet non-declared federal standard. In such a situation few litigants
would want to spend the time or money appealing; thus, the state court
decisions would be left as controlling in most cases. To undertake so
large a task as the creation of a whole body of contract law through this
slow process would leave the federal law undeclared for an indefinite
period of time. Original jurisdiction 'for the lower federal courts would
speed the development of an acceptable, uniform body of law and insure
that federal principles controlled. There would be less need for review
of lower court decisions since these courts, by virtue of their more frequent exposure to the problems of federal programs and congressional
plans, would be better qualified to deal with them.2 6
21

1d.

Such an alternative was proposed by the appellants. Brief for Appellants
at 10, Ivey Broadcasting Co. v. American Tel. & Tel., 391 F.2d 486 (2d Cir. 1968).
2'Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1947).
2128 U.S.C. § 1257(3) (1964).
12

"Kurland, The Romero Case and Some Problems of Federal Jurisdiction, 73

HARv. L. REv. 817, 824 n. 36 (1960).
" Mishkin, The Federal "Question" in the District Court, 53 COLUm. L. Rnv.
157, 195 (1953).
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The Ivey court, seeing the need for such original jurisdiction, extracted the reasoning from Justice Brennan's dissent in Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co.2 7 and made it the basis of their decision. Justice Brennan had argued that the word "laws" in § 1331
encompasses judicial decisions as well as statutes. 28 He argued that jurisdiction should be determined by the law that created the cause of action
-- whether statutory or judicial.2 9 In Romero, the court neither accepted
nor rejected Justice Brennan's argument." The court in Ivey read the
majority in Romero as holding only that since the Federal Judiciary Act
of 18751 was intended to give the federal courts a new content of jurisdiction, it did not apply to maritime law over which they already had
jurisdiction.3 2
There are valid arguments for and against Justice Brennan's interpretation. The Ivey court points out that the new interpretation is in
accord with the purpose behind the Act of 1875,' s which was to create
a forum specifically to protect federally created rights. If the federal courts
are going to make judicial law in the absence of statutes in federally
preempted areas, the causes of action under those decisional laws should
be accorded the same weight as causes of action arising under statutory
law. In this respect the new interpretation embodies the idea that it is
the source of the law-state or federal-and not the form that is
of primary importance in deciding jurisdictional issues. There should be
no distinction drawn between statutory and judicial law for jurisdictional
purposes.
It can also be argued that the Supreme Court has almost found that
federal jurisdiction can be acquired where a federal statute and its policy
require that federal principles control the issues. In Tunstall v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen & Engineers," the emphasis placed on
federal policy by the Court and its references to Clearfield Trust Co. v.
United States35 might be taken as indicative of a willingness to find that
jurisdiction could be based on judicially created rights.
, 358 U.S. 354, 389 (1959) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
393.
20 Id.
" Justice Brennan argued for his interpretation again in Wheeldin v. Wheeler,
373 U.S. 647, 653 (1963). Once again the majority did not accept or reject his
argument; it based its decision on a finding of no federal cause of action.
",Federal Judiciary Act of March 3, 1875, ch. 137, 18 Stat. 470.
" 391 F.2d at 493.
""See ALI STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDIcTION BETWEEN STATE AND
FEDERAL COURTS 77-79 (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1967).
"'323 U.S. 210 (1944).
""318 U.S. 363 (1943).
28Id. at
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The fact remains, and weighs most heavily against the new interpretation, that in interpreting § 1331 no federal courts have ever used the
word "laws" to mean judicial decisions." Thus, there is neither substantial authority nor precedent for the inclusion of judicial decisions in
the definition of "laws." It is true that in Erie the Supreme Court interpreted the Rules of Decision Act37 as including judicial decisions in
addition to statutory enactments." But there the Court was reacting to
evidence 9 that it believed made clear a congressional intent that the word
"laws" be read to include judge-made law. The analogy is even further
weakened by the holding in the case.40 To accept the new interpretation,
the Supreme Court will have to find a meaning in statutory language
that neither the courts nor the Congress have found for almost a hundred
years.
The future of the development of federal common law is uncertain.
What is certain, however, is that if the development expands it will create
an even greater need, and serve as further justification, for federal lower
court jurisdiction in those cases controlled by federal principles. It will
strengthen the attitude that it is the source of the law, not the form, that
is controlling. This will tend to make the federal courts the overseers of
the expansion of jurisdiction. In this respect, and also in their efforts
to protect and effectuate congressional legislation, the federal courts are
retreating from an established policy of leaving the extension of federal
powers to the Congress. 1 The delimitation of Erie and the finding of
original federal jurisdiction in this case indicate that federal law is no
longer solely an interstitial product, building normally upon legal rela2
tions established by the states, but has a force and authority all its own.
BEN F. TENNILLE
Only two courts have expressly excluded judicial decisions from the definition
and one of those was an admiralty case. Foster v. Herly, 330 F.2d 87, 90 (6th
Cir. 1964); Jordine v. Walling, 185 F.2d 662, 667 (3rd Cir. 1950) (admiralty).
Federal Judiciary Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 34, 1 Stat. 73.
38
304 U.S. 64, 66-67 (1938).
See Warren, New Light on the History of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789,
37 HARV. L. REv. 49 (1924).
,0 Note, The Expansion of Federal Question Jurisdiction to Maritime Clains:
A New
JurisdictionalTheory, 66 HARv. L. REv. 315, 324 n.86 (1955).
'1 Mishkin, supra note 11, at 814 & n.64.
"Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States
in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 CoLum. L. REv.
543, 545 (1954).

